Because without that knowledge, it becomes pointless - and risks total annihilation. Strangelove" is anything to go by, as long as all major world powers are made aware of the automated system, it could keep them from attacking the United States. That means that most of the data fed to the AI would be simulated data.Īnd if "Dr. People tend to blindly trust what machines are telling them, even favoring automated decision-making over human decision-making.Īnd then there's the simple fact that the AI doesn't have much data to run on, Field argues. One of them is automation bias, as Field points out in his piece. ![]() Not surprisingly, points out Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists editor Matt Field, handing over the nuclear codes to an AI could have plenty of negative side effects. It would replace what Lowther and McGiffin describe as a "system of systems, processes and people" that "must inevitably be capable of detecting launches anywhere in the world and have the ability to launch a nuclear strike against an adversary." The idea is to use an AI-powered solution to negate any surprise capabilities or advantages of retaliatory strikes of the enemy. "These new technologies are shrinking America’s senior-leader decision time to such a narrow window that it may soon be impossible to effectively detect, decide, and direct nuclear force in time," Lowther and McGiffin argue. The challenge: modern weapon technologies, particularly hypersonic cruise missiles and vehicles, cut the window even further. The attack-time compression is the phenomenon that modern technologies, including highly sensitive radar and near instantaneous communication, drastically reduced the time between detection and decision time. "t may be necessary to develop a system based on artificial intelligence, with predetermined response decisions, that detects, decides, and directs strategic forces with such speed that the attack-time compression challenge does not place the United States in an impossible position," they wrote. to occur - it would know what to do ahead of time. The new official was met with the same excuse - the president is very busy, but takes the codes very seriously and has them on hand.This time, though, the AI-powered system suggested by Lowther and McGiffin wouldn't even wait for a first strike against the U.S. When the next inspection took place the following month, that official was on vacation, according to Shelton, and another official was dispatched to the White House. Modifications of PRIS performance indicators related to. The official was dismayed, but he accepted the excuse and left. A nuclear power plant is operated most safely and effectively. The aide assured the official that Clinton took the codes seriously and had them close by. That official was told by a presidential aide that President Bill Clinton did have the codes, but was in an important meeting and could not be disturbed. (The set of codes was to be replaced entirely every four months.) However, around 2000, according to Shelton, a member of the department within the Pentagon that is responsible for all pieces of the nuclear process was dispatched to the White House to physically look at the codes and ensure they were correct - a procedure required to happen every 30 days. Henry "Hugh" Shelton, in Washington, DC, September 15, 1998. President Bill Clinton, with Defense Secretary William Cohen, left, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. ![]() The codes are on a card called the " biscuit" carried within the "football," a briefcase that is officially known as the " president's emergency satchel." ![]() That element, the president's authorization codes, is supposed to remain in close proximity to the president at all times, carried by one of five military aides, representing each branch of the military. Hugh Shelton, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from October 1997 to September 2001, the number of redundancies in the nuclear-launch process "is staggering." All of steps are "dependent on one vital element without which there can be no launch," he wrote in his 2010 autobiography, "Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior." The process the president has to go through to launch the US's nuclear weapons isn't as simple as pressing a button, but the key component of that process - the codes needed to authorize the launch - are never far from the president.Īccording to Gen. Account icon An icon in the shape of a person's head and shoulders.
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